

University of Nevada, Reno

The Effects of Intrusiveness on Protective Details

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of
Justice Management

by

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December, 2009

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We recommend that the thesis
prepared under our supervision by

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entitled

The Effects Of Intrusiveness On Protective Details

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF JUSTICE MANAGEMENT

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Abstract

A recent increase in the number of threats against federal and state judges has led to the wider use of protective details to safeguard the judiciary. Protective details, which can range from measures as simple as escorting a principal to the workplace to providing twenty-four hour protection, are employed in the protection of not only judges, but of prosecutors, court personnel and public figures in general. This thesis explores whether a relationship exists between the level of intrusiveness of protective details and their success or failure as protective measures, as well as the implications of these findings for not only the judiciary, but for anyone requiring executive protection.

The research thesis uses content analysis methods to news media accounts mentioning protective details for public figures from March 1999 to March 2009, using random sampling techniques. A linear regression model serves to analyze the possibility of a relationship between the independent variable, the level of intrusiveness of the protective detail, and the dependent variable, the protective detail's success or failure in protecting principals from harm. The resulting scatterplot and Pearson's product moment correlation analysis reveal a positive correlation between both variables. In addition, the content analysis of the data yields interesting trends that may serve as future directions for research.

Acknowledgments

I am greatly indebted to many people whose encouragement, support and advice helped me not only to complete this Master's thesis, but to fulfill the requirements for the Justice Management Master's Degree program. I consider myself privileged to know them and I cannot begin to express my gratitude for all that they have done for me, both professionally and personally.

My first round of thanks goes to my UNR graduate thesis advisors, Jim Richardson, Ph.D., J.D., Matthew Leone, Ph. D. and Dorothy Nash-Holmes, J.D., whose patient advice and constructive feedback provided me with much-needed guidance as I worked on this project. Their knowledge of the unique challenges associated with research in the judiciary arena was invaluable to my work.

In addition, I am especially grateful to the fourth member of my advisory team, the Honorable Michael J. Valentine, who graciously offered me his time and counsel, along with his vast expertise and knowledge of the judiciary and of executive protection. His enthusiasm for the topic of court security is infectious and his advocacy efforts are commendable. It has been an honor to count on his support.

Dr. Jane Robinson and Mr. Ken Gibson – the heart and soul of the Justice Management Program – spent countless hours working with me during my three years as a graduate student. Their positive attitude and their commitment to excellence greatly enhanced my academic experience and I

have nothing but the greatest admiration and respect for both of them. I truly appreciate their hard work and efforts.

I am grateful to my family and my friends for their optimism, unconditional love and encouragement. Their steadfast support means more to me than they will ever know.

I also have a second family to thank: my court family. I extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to the judges and court personnel of the Corpus Christi Division of the United States Court for the Southern District of Texas. Their commitment to the pursuit of justice is exemplary and a source of constant inspiration. I am particularly grateful to U.S. District Judge Janis Graham Jack, who encouraged me to become both a federally certified court interpreter and a graduate student in the Justice Management program. I will never forget the many lessons I have learned from her, both in and out of the courtroom, nor will I forget her kindness and generosity.

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Introduction

A recent increase in the number of threats against federal and state judges has led to the wider use of protective details to safeguard the judiciary. Judges are not alone in receiving this kind of protective measure. Within the court system, prosecutors, court personnel, and even witnesses and jurors may be the recipients of threats and may thus require protection (United States Marshals Service, 2007c). Furthermore, protective details serve to guard U.S. Presidents and their families, State Department staff, state and local leaders, public figures and celebrities. Protective details can range from measures as simple as escorting a judge to the workplace to providing twenty-four hour protection (United States Marshals Service, 2007b). The constant presence of security personnel -- a presence described as "controlling, intrusive, often overbearing and seemingly omnipotent" (Ragavan, 2002, p. 16) -- can take a tremendous toll on protectees, even when they realize and appreciate the need for protection. This research thesis seeks to establish whether a relationship exists between levels of intrusiveness in a protective detail and the protective detail's resulting success or failure in protecting a principal from harm. In addition, this thesis will explore the implications of these findings for members of the judiciary in particular, and for anyone requiring executive protection in general.

One only needs to look at recent incidents involving attacks on federal, state and local judges to know that research on judiciary security is an issue of importance to the justice system in general. In 2005, U.S. District Judge

Joan Lefkow's mother and husband were killed in her home in Chicago, Illinois (Wilgoren, Bernstein and Ruethling, 2005). Sadly, Judge Lefkow had been under protective detail for a few weeks the year before the killings occurred, but the measures were discontinued by federal and local authorities because they had determined that threats against Lefkow were "not viable (Wilgoren, 2005a)." Eleven days later, Superior Court Judge Rowland Barnes was shot and killed at the Fulton County Courthouse in Atlanta, Georgia (Dewan, 2005). The following year, the Honorable Chuck Weller, a family court judge at the Mills B. Lane Justice Center in Reno Nevada, survived a gunshot wound to the chest from a sniper while standing next to the window in his chambers (Bellisle, 2006; Hengstler, 2006). While these three incidents thrust court security issues to the forefront of the American psyche, they are not isolated. Episodes of violence occur in courts across the nation with increasing regularity.

The increase in court violence has not only affected judges. Court personnel, prosecutors, attorneys, law enforcement officers and even the public can be targets of aggression. The abovementioned 2005 attack in Fulton County, Georgia not only claimed the life of Judge Barnes, but also that of his court reporter, Julie Brandau (Dewan, 2005). A 2006 study by the Bureau for Justice Assistance and the National Sheriffs' Association notes that, over the past 35 years, eight judges have been killed in incidents of court violence, along with three prosecutors, five law enforcement officers, and 42 court participants, and dozens within each category have been assaulted

(Calhoun and Weston, 2006). The Prosecutors' Memorial, in Columbia, South Carolina, bears witness to the dangers faced by prosecutors. The monument honors nine of them, who lost their lives at the hands of assailants, in their homes, their vehicles, and their offices, as well as in court (The Prosecutors' Memorial, 2005). According to a 1997 survey of the Family Law section of the American Bar Association, 60 percent of 253 attorneys surveyed reported receiving threats from an opposing party in a case, and 17 percent received threats from their own clients (Kelson, 2001). No reminder of the dangers faced by attorneys could be more unfortunate and timelier than an incident on October 17, 2008, in which an explosion at a small law firm in Dalton, Georgia, resulted in injuries to an attorney, a legal assistant, and two clients, and in the death of the suspect (Brumback, 2008).

Attacks on judges and on those who serve the justice system not only affect them as individuals. They place court staff, attorneys, jurors, witnesses and the general public in danger. More significantly, acts of aggression against judges, attorneys and court staff are ultimately attacks on the independence of the judiciary. No one describes this better than U. S. District Judge James Moody, who, when sentencing Matthew Hale for threatening to kill federal Judge Joan Lefkow, stated that Hale's crime "undermines the judiciary's central role in our society and strikes at the very core of our government (Wilgoren, 2005b)." Finding ways to effectively deter assailants from perpetrating violence against judges and the courts is of primary importance to everyone who participates in our system of justice.

The federal courts, and the U.S. Marshals Service, which provides protection for federal judges, would benefit greatly from research on protective details and their effectiveness. Data collected by other government organizations, such as the Secret Service, which is charged with protecting the U.S. President, might prove invaluable in determining how to best approach the protection of federal judges. It is worth noting that U.S. District Judge John Wood of the Western District of Texas, who was killed by a hired assassin in 1979, had ended his protective detail six months before his assassination, after growing weary of the protection (Calhoun, 1998). Unfortunately, that decision may well have cost him his life. If protective details are intrusive enough to cause principals to reject them, they become a self-defeating endeavor.

Many state courts rely on the judicial security practices of the U.S. Marshals Service to model their own court security procedures. In addition, the U.S. Marshals Service provides judicial security training and technical assistance overseas, to countries such as Russia, Venezuela, Italy, Finland and Estonia (Weiner et al., 2000). Research of this nature could impact judicial security in courts across the nation and around the world.

Literature Review

A review of the literature on judicial security does not show a significant amount of research on protective details of members of the judiciary. There is, however, a body of research documents and media reports regarding other types of protectees, such as national and international leaders and public officials, Foreign Service officers, businessmen working in conflict areas, and celebrities in the media spotlight. It is worthy of note that the existing literature on executive protection in general does not focus on the impact of intrusiveness on the effectiveness of protective details. Exploratory and descriptive research regarding protection for public figures in general will thus be instrumental in determining whether modifications should be made to existing protection methods not only for judges, but for protectees across the security spectrum.

Security agencies initiate protective details in response to the existence of potential or actual threats against a protectee. The method used to analyze threats is known as threat assessment, defined as “the process of gathering information about persons who may have the interest, motive, intention and capability of mounting attacks against public officials and figures (Fein & Vossekuil, 1998).” The use of threat assessment to identify needs for protection is well documented in research literature (Calhoun, 1998; Fein and Vossekuil, 1998; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000). For example, after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States Secret Service has adopted a threat assessment approach for the protection of the President

and the First Family, based on the protectees' levels of risk and historical data on assassination attempts and threat overtures (Ragavan, 2002). For the federal judiciary, the U.S. Marshals Service also uses threat assessment methods to determine the need for protective details (United States Marshals Service, 2007a; Secure Access to Justice, 2005). Congress, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State of California, and the governors of twelve states examine threats through threat assessment methods (Gavin de Becker and Associates, 2005). Adjustments are made to protective details based on the nature of threats (Secure Access to Justice, 2005), the behaviors and risk factors associated with potential and actual assailants (Turner and Gelles, 2003), as well as on the protectee's level of visibility, the types of issues dealt with by the protectee's agency, and the protectee's travel needs and personal preferences (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000). During the 2005 federal year alone, the U.S. Marshals Service executed 68 protective details for judges and assistant U.S. attorneys, based on "inappropriate communications or potential threats (Tong, 2006, p. CRS-4)." Therefore, a detailed knowledge of the threat assessment process is essential for a clear understanding of how protective details function and vary according to the principal's needs.

Research literature and media reports on the intrusive nature of protective and security details delve into the need to strike a balance between the need for protection and the need for privacy (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000; Abrams, 2001; Ragavan, 2002). Secret Service agents, for example, work in

such close physical proximity to the President that they use their bodies to physically shield him from harm (Abrams, 2001; Petro, 2005). That level of closeness, and the ensuing lack of privacy that results, makes the trust relationship between the agents and their protectee essential, since they are privy to the protectee's most intimate life details (Abrams, 2001). From President Harry Truman, who described himself as a "prisoner" while being guarded after an attack on his life (Abrams, 2001, p. 330), to First Lady Laura Bush, who was concerned about the "repeated intrusions" into her twin daughters' privacy (Ragavan, 2002, p. 16), protectees have found themselves unwilling to yield to the overbearing nature of protective measures, while understanding, at the same time, that their public role warrants such security.

Federal judges are no strangers to the yoke of intrusiveness inherent to protective details. U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey – who previously served as a federal judge for the Southern District of New York – was under protective detail from 1995 to 2007, after he presided over the trial of Omar Abdel Rahman. Not only were U.S. Marshals stationed at his chambers and residence throughout the duration of the 12-year detail; he also traveled in an armored limousine, often accompanied by an escort vehicle and even bomb-sniffing dogs (Schmidt and Linzer, 2007). The strain in the protector – protectee relationship became evident when Mukasey went as far as forbidding the U.S. Marshals protecting him from flushing toilets inside his home during night hours (Jordan and Bartlett, 2007). The U.S. Marshals

Service ended Mukasey's protective detail after the U.S. Marshals protecting him filed a federal complaint against him and another judge (Jordan, 2007).

As far as judge's attitudes toward protective details, perhaps they are best described by Gary Hengstler (2006), Director of the National Judicial College's National Center for Courts and Media:

...Strengthening security at the courthouse, itself, can do little to protect the judge where he or she is most vulnerable – in the judge's private life. Every judge surrenders a measure of privacy simply by the nature of the job. Fortunately, we have not reached the stage where armed bodyguards are assigned to judges and their families. Nor is it likely that most judges would want to have to adjust their lives to accommodate such protection (p. 17).

Principals have, on occasion, rejected protection or attempted to escape from it, sometimes with deadly results. President Gerald Ford's daughter Susan managed to escape her protective detail, as did President George Bush's daughter Barbara (Nevius, 2004; Ragavan, 2002). Princess Diana of Wales had rejected royal police protection, calling it a "shackle" on her private life, but the former director of Scotland Yard claims she might have never died if she had continued the protection (Wright, 2006). In Spain, town councilor Manuel Indiano was shot and killed, allegedly by Basque separatists, after refusing police protection (Spain Mourns Murdered Politician, 2000). In the Netherlands, Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was shot and stabbed to death after receiving death threats over a movie he had made that was critical of Islam (Veldhuys, 2004). His killer had intended to kill his film collaborator, Somali-born Dutch parliament member Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who lived under police protection in Amsterdam, but selected Van Gogh because he refused to have

bodyguards (Buruma, 2005). The killer left Hirsi Ali a death threat at the scene of the murder. Later on, Hirsi Ali's neighbors complained that the protection she received had become a "nuisance" for them and she was forced to leave her home (Former Dutch Legislator Hirsi Ali Welcome in US, 2006).

It thus becomes evident that, just as in the case of Judge Wood of Texas, killed after discontinuing his protective detail, the interruption of intrusive protection measures can end up costing protectees their lives. It is impossible to protect someone who refuses protection. When a protectee finds a security detail so intolerable as to refuse it, the protection has failed to fulfill its purpose. Author and former Secret Service agent Joseph Petro describes it best, saying, "In the end, the Secret Service can only provide as much protection as the protectee is willing to accept (Petro, 2005, p. 17)." Determining if there is a correlation between the level of intrusiveness of a detail and its effectiveness in protecting a principal may assist law enforcement and security agencies to achieve a balance between security and privacy, and lead to improved protection of public officials and members of the judiciary.

For the purposes of this research thesis, the intrusiveness of a protective detail is operationally defined as a protective detail's degree of interference, interruption, or invasiveness of someone's personal or professional life, based on a rating scale ranging from no intrusiveness to high levels of intrusiveness. The operational definition of the success or failure of the protective detail

involves the detail's ability to keep a principal free from harm throughout the duration of the protective detail, from onset to conclusion. Since there will be varying degrees of success or failure, this variable may also be measured through a rating scale, ranging from failure (inability to protect a principal from harm for the duration of the detail) to success (ability to protect a principal throughout the full term of the detail).

Methodology

Research methodology for this thesis consists of a longitudinal study of U.S. media reports on protective details from March 1999 to March 2009, using context analysis to determine whether a correlation exists between a protective detail's degree of intrusiveness and its success or failure in protecting a principal from harm.

Media reports gathered from primary online search engines, databases, and national newspaper and magazine indexes comprise the research data for this thesis. This multi-pronged approach yielded a more complete source list, given that using Internet research engines exclusively may yield as little as 30% of available content (Krippendorf, 2004). Therefore, the media items reviewed come from not only Internet search engines but also from databases such ProQuest, which include complete indexes for newspapers and newsweeklies of state and national coverage and readership, such as The New York Times, the Washington Post, USA Today, The Chicago Tribune, The Los Angeles Times, Time, U.S. News and World Report, and Newsweek.

A preliminary pilot review of 25 media articles on protective details from 2000 to 2009 indicated that major incidents involving protective details received national coverage in addition to local coverage, which makes national newspaper and magazine indexes suited for data collection. State newspapers are also included as a source of additional information because research indicates that, while threats against federal judges have increased considerably since 2003, no corresponding statistics exist regarding threats

against state judges. It is believed, however, that security incidents may actually be greater in state courts than in federal courts (Perkins, et a., 2006).

Focusing on U.S. media reports versus reports from the foreign press serves to eliminate the possible effect of cultural bias, since concepts such as intrusiveness, privacy, movement and personal space are culturally bound constructs (Altman & Chemers, 1984; Hall, 1956; Hall, 1976; Ting-Toomey, 1999). Edward Hall, the father of proxemics -- the study of how spatial interpersonal distances are a product of one's culture -- notes that conversational distances among Latin Americans are much closer than those commonly associated with Americans (Hall, 1956). In a protective detail, which may require an agent to stand only inches away from a protectee, it is easy to see how perceptions of intrusiveness could easily differ among protectees of different cultural backgrounds. While no research exists on cultural issues pertaining to intrusiveness in executive protection, Tipton and Krause have noted cultural differences pertaining to intrusiveness in the use of biometric technology (2007). Therefore, this study excludes media items from the foreign press, as well as media items from U.S. sources covering foreign protectees.

The selected ten-year time frame for review, divided into twenty six-month periods, covers important milestones in both the areas of protective intelligence and judicial security. It includes, for example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which transformed executive protection, incorporating a greater emphasis on threat assessment methodology (Ragavan, 2002), and

increasing the focus on security in the federal judiciary (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004). It also encompasses a documented increase of violence against the judiciary in the United States since 2003 (National Center for State Courts Staff, 2006), including the shootings of a county judge and his court reporter in Atlanta (Dewan, 2005) and the murders of the husband and mother of a federal judge in Chicago (Wilgoren, 2005), as well as the sniper attack on a family law judge in Reno (Bellisle, 2006).

One of the difficulties inherent in using media reports for content analysis data is that, as noted by van Driel and Richardson (1988), it is “almost always only the controversies that made the news (p. 57).” Protective details with negative results, or with negative descriptions, may be deemed more newsworthy by their very nature. Successful protective details may receive no media coverage. Furthermore, protectees concerned about security breaches may never share their feelings – positive, neutral or negative -- about their protective details with the media. In an attempt to provide some balance, the item pool for selection also included journals covering the presidency and the judiciary, as well as articles from government publications – such as agency and Congressional reports – which may be more likely to provide information on successful protective details than traditional media outlets. News media reports are likely to provide a protectee’s perspective, whereas a government report may provide a protector’s point of view.

These individual media items – articles, editorial pieces, interviews and reports –serve as the context units for analysis, whereas the recording units

coded consist of the following system of enumeration: a single description of a protective detail for a single protectee. This approach takes into account Holsti's (1969) distinction between recording units as "the specific segment of content that is characterized by placing it in a given category (p. 116)", and context units as "the largest body of content that may be searched to characterize a recording unit (p. 118)." The subject-matter categories focused on the various aspects involved in executive protection, including protectee traits, predator traits, the nature of threats, and the type of protective detail, along with the independent variable, the protective detail's degree of intrusiveness, and the dependent variable, the success or failure of the protective detail. These analysis categories are exhaustive, mutually exclusive and independent, criteria set forth by both Holsti (1969) and Neuendorf (2002).

The steps followed for data analysis conform to Neuendorf's flowchart for the typical process of content analysis research (Neuendorf, 2002). Having operationally defined the intrusiveness of a protective detail (its degree of interference, interruption, or invasiveness of someone's personal or professional life), as well as the success or failure of the protective detail (its ability to keep a principal free from harm throughout the duration of the protective detail, from onset to conclusion), the next steps in the research continuum involved creating a codebook and coding form, pilot testing both by means of preliminary coding, creating a list of media items to be sampled, performing the coding of the sample items, and ensuring intra-rater reliability

through the re-coding of selected items twice over time. In addition to the codebook and coding form, the actual words used to describe protective details in the media reports analyzed were recorded in a dictionary, tracking the frequency of occurrence of the terms, as well as assigning direction categories to each based on a five-point nominal scale (highly positive, positive, neutral, negative, highly negative).

The final step in the analysis involved tabulation and reporting. A linear regression model served to analyze the independent variable (Y), the level of intrusiveness of the protective detail, and the dependent variable (X), the protective detail's success or failure in protecting principals from harm. The independent variable was assessed using a six-point scale, in which a value of 0 equals no intrusiveness and a value of 5 represents extreme intrusiveness. Similarly, the dependent variable was assessed using a five-point scale, ranging from -2, which equals the failure of a protective detail resulting in the death of the protectee, to +2, which equals the success of a protective detail, in which the protectee fell under absolutely no harm. A scatterplot was used to see whether there an association existed between both variables by showing if $Y = f(X)$. Additionally, a Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient analysis was used to corroborate the results of the linear regression analysis.

Results

An Internet and database search of media reports from March 1999 to March 2009 yielded a total of 278 U.S. news reports on protective details for American public figures. From these, 93 media reports, or 33.4% of the total item pool, were selected through random sampling techniques for content analysis and coding.

From the random item pool, 45 news reports contained specific references to the intrusive nature of protective details, thus constituting a purposive sample derived from the random sample initially generated. The ensuing analysis of these 45 context units yielded the following scatterplot (Figure 1), based on the data listed in Table 1:




Figure 1. Proportion of intrusiveness levels of protective details and their degree of success or failure.

Intrusiveness Levels and Degrees of Success or Failure

Protective Detail	Intrusiveness (x)	Success (y)	Protective Detail	Intrusiveness (x)	Success (y)
001	5	+2	024	5	3
002	5	+2	025	5	3
003	4	+2	026	4	4
004	5	+2	027	4	+2
005	5	-2	028	0	0
006	5	+2	029	4	+2
007	5	3	030	0	0
008	5	3	031	5	4
009	5	-2	032	5	3
010	5	+2	033	4	2
011	5	+2	034	4	3
012	5	+2	035	4	3
013	5	+2	036	4	3
014	5	3	037	4	3
015	5	3	038	4	3
016	5	3	039	4	3
017	5	3	040	4	3
018	5	3	041	5	2
019	5	+2	042	3	3
020	5	+2	043	4	3
021	5	+2	044	1	+1
022	5	+2	045	4	3
023	5	3			
		Totals (Σ)	45	195	102

Table 1. Correlations between levels of intrusiveness and degrees of success or failure of protective details, as described in a selection of U.S. media reports from March 1999 to March 2009.

For both Figure 1 and Table 1, intrusiveness levels are defined as follows:

0. Absent/INAP (select if there was no protective detail)
1. Non-intrusive (protective detail causes no interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life)
2. Minimally intrusive (protective detail causes minimal interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g. use of technology or CPTED)

3. Moderately intrusive (protective detail causes moderate interruption or interference in protectee's professional or personal life, e.g. escort to workplace)
4. Highly intrusive (protective detail causes high degree of interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g. 24/7 protection for weeks at a time)
5. Severely intrusive (protective detail causes severe interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g. 24/7 protection for extended periods, such as years, use of armored vehicles, use of bomb-sniffing dogs, inability to travel or work with ease)
6. N/A – not ascertained

Degrees of success or failure are noted according to the following values:

- 2 Failure resulting in death of protectee
- 1 Failure resulting in injury of protectee,
- 0 Absent/INAP,
- +1 Success – protectee is attacked but unharmed,
- +2 Success in which protectee is neither attacked nor harmed,
- 3 N/A – not ascertained
- 4 Other

The linear regression model yields the following regression equation:

$$y = 0.2969x + 0.9802$$

A calculation of the Pearson's product-moment correlation produced an r value of 0.291, an r^2 value of 0.084, a slope of 0.297, a y intercept of 0.9802, and a standard error of estimate of 1.1926.

Both methods of analysis show a positive correlation between levels of intrusiveness and degrees of success or failure, albeit not a particularly strong correlation. These results therefore need to be regarded with caution and may simply point to a need for further research in this area as opposed to

definitive conclusions on a correlation. Examining a hypothesis by various research methods is always highly desirable, as a triangulation of methods can reinforce a researcher's conclusions (Neuendorf, 2002).

One alternative research method that may be advisable to corroborate a positive correlation would be a protectee survey, perhaps among state and federal judges who have received protection at some point in their judicial career. Conducting a survey of the judiciary presents unique challenges, such as how to survey professionals of high stature in our society who are not always available for interviewing and who may not, for a variety of reasons, respond to mail surveys in large numbers. Yet, when done systematically and with strong emphasis on the training of interviewers and coders, judicial surveys are an effective and important means of obtaining data on the judiciary (Labbin, et al., 2001). Such a survey might provide the means corroborating a positive correlation between the two variables studied in this research project.

In addition to the numerical models noted above, the analysis of the content of the media items included the preparation of a dictionary of terms describing intrusiveness, found in Appendix 3. The creation of this dictionary posed several unexpected challenges but revealed interesting information about private and public perceptions about the intrusiveness of protective details.

First of all, while descriptors tend to fall under the grammatical category of adjectives, dictionary entries include all parts of speech, since there are

nouns and verbs intricately linked to how people describe protective details that reveal their perceptions of the detail's effectiveness. Verbs such as "lurk," "shepherd," "hover," and "guard" – all used to describe an agent's proximity to a protectee – carry great depth in meaning and can shed light on the source's perceptions of a protective detail, sometimes in ways that an adjective never could. The same premise applies to nouns. The use of noun phrases such as "dog handlers," "explosive ordinance technicians," and "metal detectors" all convey the level of seriousness and intrusiveness that a protective detail may entail, even though they would not necessarily carry the same force in a different context or examined in isolation. Furthermore, they might be assigned different values depending on how they are perceived by a protector, who sees them as assets to his work, or by a protectee, who may either see them as nuisances or obstacles, or as life-saving benefits.

Ascribing values to terms in isolation proved to be an impossible and undesirable task, as no word can be truly examined for meaning without regard to its content (Hall, 1976). The dictionary therefore includes not only the descriptor term, but its surrounding context, as the same term may have more than one value – sometimes even opposing values – depending on contextual clues. Furthermore, dictionary entries may have multiple values, depending on the various contexts under which they appear. While the dictionary notes the frequency of use of each term, examining the frequency of use may be of limited utility, since the term is used in multiple contexts and with various shades of meaning, often unrelated to a protective detail. One

example of such a term is “watch,” appearing 40 different times in the random sample, and receiving opposing values of +2 and -2, since the idea of being watched was seen as both an asset and a liability, depending on the source of the commentary.

Commentary sources also played a crucial role in the assignment of descriptor values. A predator such as John Hinckley, Jr., who attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and later stalked President Jimmy Carter, considered the closeness of agents in a protective detail to be a deterrent (Abrams, 2001). From his perspective, the adjective “close” would therefore be assigned a negative value. A protector, however, who knows that an agent’s proximity shields a protectee from a potential assailant, would place a high positive value on the same word. A protectee just saved from an attack because an agent was close would certainly give a high score to the word “close,” while a protectee who finds the agent’s proximity overbearing would give the same word a strongly negative value.

The strong relationship between a term’s positive or negative connotation and its context and source of commentary point to the need to examine perceptions of protective details from all points of view: those of protectees, protectors, the media, and the general public. The need for such an analysis also arises from a general examination of the context of the general coverage of protective details in the random item pool. News items discussed protective details from a variety of angles: their effectiveness, their cost to the taxpayer,

their necessity, and even examined the relationship between protector and protectee.

The protector-protectee dyad is worthy of special attention, as it is a recurring theme throughout the item pool. Some of the news coverage focuses on the positive: in the cases of President Reagan (Wilmot, 2004), Judge Lefkow (Schmich, 2005) and Susan Ford, daughter of President Gerald Ford (Ferguson, 2001), articles focused on the closeness and the bond of affection between each of the principals and their protectors. Other items, however, focused on the cost to taxpayers. Several items, for example, provided scathing commentary about the security expenses involved in the protection of Texas Governor Rick Perry, and criticized the perceived lack of protection when an alleged act of arson damaged the Governor's Mansion in Austin (Fikac, et al., 2008; Root, 2009; Selby, et al., 2007; Fikac, 2007.). Still other news coverage examined the apparent confusion surrounding the roles of protectors, sometimes perceived as nothing more than glorified chauffeurs or valets, as was the case in the protection of Environmental Protection Agency director Christine Todd Whitman (Heilprin, 2003) and in the case of former federal Judge and current Attorney General Michael Mukasey (Jordan, 2007). The unique character of the protector-protectee relationship is generally unexplored in executive protection research and may be an avenue of investigation that could yield useful information. Some research in this regard already exists (Cooper, 2006), which indicates that this is a topic worthy of further review. Other potential dyads for study include the protector-

predator dyad and the protectee-predator dyad, also covered in the media during the period selected for this research. Even a potential triad emerges -- the protector-protectee-predator triad – the study of which could potentially shed light on how to improve the success of protective details.

Just as it was hard to quantify descriptors of protective details according to their positive or negative nuances, it was also difficult at times to quantify levels of success or failure. There were instances where a protectee managed to stay alive and unharmed, but harm befell family members, as in the case of Judge Lefkow (Wilgoren, 2005). In another case, First Lady Laura Bush reported that on one occasion, while President George W. Bush staged a surprise visit to the troops in Iraq over Thanksgiving, she called his protective detail to inquire about his well-being, only to find that they were unaware of his trip and assumed he was spending the holiday at the family ranch in Crawford, Texas (The nation: First Lady calls for balance amid fears, 2003). While the President was unharmed and safe, how can one qualify the protective detail as successful when the protectors were not sure where their protectee was? These difficulties in determining success tended to be the exception rather than the norm, however, and generally the content of the article allowed for coding success with clarity and accuracy.

Another variable that presented coding difficulties because of a lack of information was that of race, be it that of the protectee or the predator. The news media in general has guidelines for race reporting, in which a person's race is not mentioned unless it is relevant to the story being reported or

unless an event is the first of its kind for a particular racial group (Goldstein, 2002). The only news items reporting protectee or predator race were those pertaining to Matthew Hale, a white supremacist convicted of issuing a death threat against federal Judge Joan Lefkow (Paulson & Knickerbocker, 2005), and President Barack Obama, the nation's first African-American president (Burton & West, 2008).

Some of the media items reviewed revealed details about protective details that, in the wrong hands, could serve to harm a protectee. One good example of this trend was a news story about New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's subway travel habits. The report stated, "Turns out that one of the city's best-kept secrets is that our billionaire mayor rides the subway to and from work every day," and included the train number, station and time of day in the story, along with the number of security guards accompanying him (To these victors go the grudges, 2003).

In sharp contrast, however, several news items cited security concerns as a factor in not revealing details about executive protection. While this lack of data does not lend itself to optimal content analysis, it is in fact excellent news for those providing security and for their protectees, as security leaks into the media could have deleterious effects for principals, their workplaces, and their homes.

While many news articles cited law enforcement as the source declining to provide details about security (Preston, 2004), there was one instance in particular where the media item seemed purposely not to report details that

could pose a threat to a protectee. In this instance, a comment was made by Texas Governor Rick Perry, when criticized over the size of the house he selected as temporary quarters after the gubernatorial mansion was burned by arson. His exact words were, "But there's 21 members of the governor's protective detail that use up probably a good third of the space (MacLaggan, 2007)." Clearly, revealing the exact number of agents on his detail was not good operational security on Perry's part. While many media outlets quoted Governor Perry verbatim, one news report quoted him in the following manner: "But you know, there are [numerous] members of the governor's protective detail who use up probably a good third of the space (Hoppe, 2007)."

This example would seem to indicate that journalists self-monitor the information they provide in the media for security purposes. While there is no mandatory ethical code for journalists, the Society of Professional Journalists does have a voluntary Code of Ethics which seeks, among other things, to "minimize harm" by recognizing that "gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort (Society of Professional Journalists, 1996; National Center for the Courts and Media, 2007)." Perhaps it was this guideline that led the journalist in question to abstain from reporting a security detail unwisely revealed by a protectee.

It is all too easy for protectees, during contacts with the media, to inadvertently reveal highly sensitive information that could jeopardize their

own lives, the lives of their families, and the security and well-being of everyone who works around them, just as Governor Perry did.

One instance, pertaining to the judiciary, involved a 2005 Public Broadcasting Service interview with United States District Judge Jane Roth, of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and former head of the U.S. Judicial Conference Security Committee. During the interview, which focused on the safety of judges, Judge Roth provided, in response to the reporter's questions, detailed information on which U.S. Marshals carry weapons in the courtroom, and on the type of security measures she has in her residence – including the breed of guard dog she has to protect her home (Werner, 2005). This level of detail could potentially have placed Judge Roth and her family at tremendous risk. Furthermore, her comments essentially jeopardized the safety and operations of the U.S. Marshals Service and placed every person in the courtroom in danger. The transcript is still, to this date, readily available for anyone with a computer to read on the PBS website. Anyone with a grudge against the court system could easily use this information against the judiciary, and the Internet now provides generalized access to this kind of data in perpetuity. Perhaps measures of protection need to include training protectees to safeguard sensitive security information, be it in their interactions with the media or with any unauthorized person.

A closer examination of the number of media items and resulting protective details, according to time period, shows an increase in the number of protective details reported since the year 2003, a trend that was first noted

by the National Center for State Courts (2006). Table 2 illustrates this increase:

Number of Protective Details per Items Reviewed

TIME PERIOD	MEDIA ITEMS REVIEWED	PROTECTIVE DETAILS
March 1999-August 1999	1	4
September 1999-February 2000	6	10
March 2000-August 2000	4	6
September 2000-February 2001	6	6
March 2001-August 2001	3	14
September 2001-February 2002	1	1
March 2002-August 2002	5	11
September 2002-February 2003	5	9
March 2003-August 2003	3	3
September 2003-February 2004	6	27
March 2004-August 2004	6	8
September 2004-February 2005	1	1
March 2005-August 2005	8	38
September 2005-February 2006	5	5
March 2006-August 2006	4	5
September 2006-February 2007	4	4
March 2007-August 2007	5	7
September 2007-February 2008	5	5
March 2008-August 2008	12	13
September 2008-February 2009	3	3
Totals	93	180

Table 2. Number of protective details per media items reviewed, according to time period.

While there does not appear to be an increase in the number of media items devoted to protective details, the number of protective details increases

sharply after 2003. The content analysis research does not provide reasons for this general upward trend, nor does the literature.

The highest number of protective details occurred in the time period between March and August of 2005, a figure that can be explained by the amount of coverage focusing on the case of federal Judge Joan Lefkow, whose husband and mother were murdered in her home (Wilgoren, 2005a). News items during that period tended to not only cover Judge Lefkow's situation, but also delved into the cases of other judges, as well as prosecutors and defense attorneys, who also received protective measures. A review of protectee professions reveals this group under the category "Other public figure":

Protectee Professions

PROFESSION	NUMBER OF PROTECTEES
President	37
Vice-President	10
Cabinet member	3
State leader	37
Local leader	8
Media celebrity	0
Author	0
Federal judge	39
State or local judge	1
Other public figure	13
Relative of public figure	8
Not employed	0
Retired	1
Presidential candidate	2
Vice-Presidential candidate	5
Not ascertained	2

Table 3: Protectee professions, as described in the media item pool, from March 1999 to March 2009.

Federal judges constituted the largest population of protectees, followed by Presidents, state leaders and other public figures – including attorneys and

prosecutors. Research on judiciary protection should perhaps not just center on the protection of judges, but should also encompass the protection of attorneys. Such an expansion in scope might yield information of value for executive protection in general.

Two cases of attacks on the judiciary that were notably absent from the item pool were those of Fulton County Judge Rowland Barnes, murdered in Atlanta, Georgia (Dewan, 2005), and Nevada family judge Chuck Weller, wounded by a sniper in his chambers (Bellisle, 2006; Hengstler, 2006). Only one news item mentions Judge Barnes (Leonard, 2005), but in relation to the Lefkow murders, which occurred only eleven days before Judge Barnes' death. A report by the Fulton County Courthouse Security Commission (Fulton County, 2005) makes no mention of any protection in place for Judge Barnes. It does note, however, that the judge and deputies protecting the courthouse knew of threats made by the assailant, Brian Nichols. It was agreed by all the parties, however, that Nichols' defense attorney was the most vulnerable and arrangements were made to have extra deputies available at the next court hearing. Sadly, no mention was made of providing Judge Barnes with a protective detail. In the case of Judge Weller, an Internet search does not provide any information that would indicate that he was under protection at the time he was attacked. Since no reports were found indicating that either Judge Barnes or Judge Weller had a protective detail at the time of the attacks staged against them, it would explain why an Internet

or database search of articles would not have included any media items pertaining to their cases.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Research results indicate a positive correlation between intrusiveness levels and degrees of success or failure of protective details, but more research is necessary, ideally through other research methods such as protectee surveys, to ascertain the strength and validity of this potential correlation.

The dearth of resources on protective details points to a need to develop more research in executive protection. Several new areas of research have emerged from this study that merit further investigation. They include the impact of culture on executive protection in general, and judicial security in particular, as well as a closer look at how different groups – protectees, protectors, the media, and the public at large – perceive and understand the need for protective details.

An examination of the various relationships involved in the protection process – the dyadic relationships between protectee and protector dyad, protector and predator, and protectee and predator are vital for a better understanding of the dynamics of executive protection and may serve to improve the effectiveness of protective details. Furthermore, the triad formed by the interrelationships of a predator, a protector and a protectee may also elucidate better protection methods.

For the judiciary, not only should the protective details of judges be the objects of research. Defense attorneys and prosecutors also face dangers and are placed under protection as a result. Understanding the protective

process from their perspective may serve useful for the field of executive protection at large.

Finally, it is of utmost importance to develop awareness in protectees, protectors, and the media of the need to protect secure information that could endanger a protectee if it were to fall into the wrong hands.

The protection of the judiciary is essential to maintain the rule of law and our system of justice. In their own way, those who wear black robes and those who wear silver stars – judges and their protectors – defend our judicial system by performing their duties daily in spite of the dangers those duties may entail. Their protection represents the protection of the values our country holds dear.

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**Appendix 1
Sample Code Sheet**

CODER ID _____ 001 _____ CODING DATE _____ 11/03/09 _____	
CODING CATEGORIES	CODE
I. Media Report Information	
A. Item ID Number	
B. Item date	
C. Media report type	
D. Item length (word count)	
E. Item's degree of focus on protective details	
II. Protectee Characteristics	
A. Gender	
B. Race/ethnicity	
C. Age	
D. Professional position	
E. Number of years employed	
F. Number of protective details in the past	
G. Number of Inappropriate Communications and Contacts (IC&Cs) received	
H. Number of assaults suffered in the past	
III. Predator Characteristics	
A. Gender	
B. Race	
C. Age	
D. Criminal history	
E. Mental illness history	
F. Number of predators Exact Number (if provided) _____	
IV. Characteristics of Inappropriate Communications & Contacts (IC&Cs):	
A. IC&C	
B. Type of threat	
B. Method of delivery	
C. Number of previous IC&Cs made	
D. Number of current IC&Cs made	
E. Date(s) of current IC&Cs	
V. Protective Detail Characteristics	
A. Duration	
B. Date(s) of protective detail	

C. Presence of a threat	
D. Geographic location	
E. Setting	
F. Nature of activities protected	
G. Use of human resources in implementation	
H. Number of agents deployed	
I. Use of technologies in implementation	
J. Use of bomb-sniffing dogs	
K. Use of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) techniques	
L. Number of contact hours per day	
M. Level of acquaintance between principal and protector	
VI. Intrusiveness of Protective Detail	
A. Level of intrusiveness of protective detail	
B. Words used to describe protective detail (<i>list textually for inclusion in dictionary in the space below</i>)	
C. Source of comments on intrusiveness	
VII. Success/Failure of Protective Detail	
A. Degree of success or failure	
B. Evasive actions by protectee towards protective detail	
C. Refusal of protection by protectee	
D. Discontinuation of detail	
E. Source of discontinuation of protective detail	

Appendix 2 Codebook

UNIT OF DATA COLLECTION:

Data units consist of a single description of a protective detail for a single protectee, contained in a media item. If a media item contains more than one description of a protective detail, or describes protective details for multiple protectees, it will be coded more than once, with separate code sheets for each single description of a protective detail.

DEFINITIONS:

Protectee: the person requiring executive protection measures (also referred to as the *principal*).

Protective detail: a security assignment protecting a public figure, including members of the judiciary, at home, in the workplace, or during travel, ranging from escorting a protectee to the workplace to providing the protectee with round-the-clock protection for extended time periods (*adapted from United States Marshals Service, January 2007*).

Threat: a type of inappropriate communication explicitly expressing intended violence. The threat may be direct (for example, “I will kill you,”) veiled (e.g., “you’ll get what’s coming”) or conditional (e.g. “you must do what I say, or else I will ...”) (*adapted from Calhoun, 1998 and Fein & Vossekuil, 1998*).

Assault: the threat or use of force causing someone to fear imminent harm or physical injury (*adapted from Black’s Law Dictionary, 2001*).

Inappropriate Communication or Contact (IC&C): any message of a questionable or suspicious nature that causes concern, even without constituting a threat, made verbally, in writing, through another person, or through suspicious activities. Threats are but one type of inappropriate communication (*adapted from Calhoun, 1998; Calhoun & Weston, 2003; and Clark, 2005*).

Predator: a person who may have the interest, motive, intention and capability of mounting attacks against public officials and figures (*Fein & Vossekuil, 1998*)

Intrusiveness: a protective detail's degree of interference, interruption, or invasiveness of someone's personal or professional life, based on a rating scale ranging from no intrusiveness to high levels of intrusiveness.

Success/Failure of a Protective Detail: the detail's ability to keep a principal free from harm throughout the duration of the protective detail, from onset to conclusion, and measured through a rating scale, ranging from failure (inability to protect a principal from harm for the duration of the detail) to success (ability to protect a principal throughout the full term of the detail).

COMPLETING THE CODE SHEET:

Coder ID: List the ID number of the coder filling out the code sheet.

Coding Date: Provide the date the code sheet was completed.

I. Media Report Information

A. Item ID Number: Write the media item's four-digit ID number, found on the top right side of the item's first page, and corresponding to the item's electronic file name.

B. Item date: List the item date, using the format mm/dd/yyyy. If no date is provided, write "n.d."

Note: the item date may differ from the date or dates of the protective detail, or the date of the incident leading to the assignment of a protective detail. Refer to Section IV, Item E, and Section V, Item B to note such dates if they appear in the article.

C. Media Report Type: Indicate the type of media item coded, according to the following list:

1. News article
2. News transcript
3. Editorial
4. Interview
5. Government agency report
6. Government publication
7. Journal article
8. Magazine article
9. Press agency report
10. Other
11. N/A (not ascertained)

D. Item Length: Calculate the media item's word count by using the Word Count feature in Microsoft Word. Note the length of the news item according to word count by selecting from the following list:

1. Under 600 words
2. 601 – 800 words
3. 801-1000 words
4. 1001-1200 words
5. 1201-1500 words
6. 1501-1800 words
7. 1801-1999 words
8. Over 2000 words

E. Item's Degree of Focus on Protective Details: Indicate whether a protective detail is the item's main or secondary topic.

1. Main topic
2. Secondary topic
3. N/A (not ascertained)

II. Protectee Characteristics

A. Gender: Note the protectee's gender. If the article does not note gender, code as 3, *even if the protectee's gender is common knowledge*. It is acceptable to use grammatical articles (he/his, she/her) to determine the gender as stated in the article and to use the protectee's name to determine gender.

1. Male
2. Female
3. N/A (not ascertained)

B. Race/Ethnicity: Provide the protectee's race or ethnicity. If the article does not note race, code as 3, *even if the protectee's race is common knowledge*.

1. White
2. African-American
3. Hispanic
4. Asian/Pacific Islander
5. Native American
6. Other
7. N/A – not ascertained

C. Age: Specify the protectee's age.

1. 0 – 20 yrs
2. 21-40 yrs
3. 41-60 years
4. 61 – 80 years
5. 81 yrs and above
7. N/A – not ascertained

D. Professional Position: Report the protectee's job or professional status during the time of the protective detail. If the protective detail is assigned to a presidential or vice-presidential candidate, code as 14 or 15, respectively, even if they are also serving simultaneously as a cabinet member or state leader. If the protectee is retired and protected, code as 13; if, however, the article refers to a protective detail while still employed, code under the position held during the protective detail.

1. President
2. Vice-President
3. Cabinet member
4. State leader
5. Local leader
6. Media celebrity
7. Author
8. Federal judge
9. State or local judge
10. Other public figure
11. Relative of public figure
12. Not employed
13. Retired
14. Presidential candidate
15. Vice-presidential candidate
16. N/A – not ascertained

E. Number of Years Employed: Indicate the protectee's years of employment at the time of the protective detail.

0. Absent/INAP
1. 0 – 5 years
2. 6 – 10 years
3. 11-15 years
4. 16 – 20 years
5. 21 years and above
6. N/A – not ascertained

F. Number of Protective Details in the Past: Note the number of protective details experienced by the protectee prior to the detail

described in the media item. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent (none)/INAP
- 1. 1 – 3
- 2. 4 – 6
- 3. 7 – 10
- 4. 11 and above
- 5. N/A – not ascertained

G. Number of Inappropriate Communications and Contacts (IC&Cs)

Received: Note the number of inappropriate communications and contacts received by the protectee. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent (none)/INAP
- 1. 1 – 3
- 2. 4-6
- 3. 7 – 10
- 4. 11 and above
- 5. N/A – not ascertained
- 6. Multiple IC&Cs, but number not specified

H. Number of Assaults Suffered in the Past: Note the number of assaults previously suffered by the protectee. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent (none)/INAP
- 1. 1 – 3
- 2. 4-6
- 3. 7 – 10
- 4. 11 and above
- 5. N/A not ascertained

III. Predator Characteristics:

A. Gender: Note the predator's gender. If no predator is mentioned, code as 4.

- 1. Male
- 2. Female
- 3. N/A -not ascertained
- 4. No predator mentioned

B. Race: Provide the predator's race or ethnicity. If no predator is mentioned, code as 8.

1. White
2. African-American
3. Hispanic
4. Asian/Pacific Islander
5. Native American
6. Other
7. N/A – not ascertained
8. No predator mentioned

C. Age: Specify the predator's age. If not stated in the media item, code as 6 (N/A, not ascertained). If no predator is mentioned, code as 7.

1. 0 – 20 yrs
2. 21 – 40 yrs
3. 41 – 60 years
4. 61 – 80 years
5. 81 yrs and above
6. N/A – not ascertained
7. No predator mentioned

D. Criminal History: Indicate the presence of a criminal history in the predator's background. If not noted in the media item, code as 2 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0. If no predator is mentioned, code as 3.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A – not ascertained
3. No predator mentioned

E. Mental Illness History: Indicate the presence of a history of mental illness in the predator's background. If not noted in the media item, code as 2 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0. If no predator is mentioned, code as 3.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A – not ascertained
3. No predator mentioned

F. Number of Predators: Indicate whether the article denotes more than one predator. If not noted in media item, code as 2. If none, code

as 0. If no predator is mentioned, code as 4. If an exact number of predators is given, please note on the space provided.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Single predator
2. Multiple predators (list exact number, if provided)
3. N/A – not ascertained
4. No predator mentioned

IV. Characteristics of Inappropriate Communications & Contacts (IC&Cs): (*adapted from Calhoun, 1998*)

A. IC&C type (*adapted from Calhoun, 1998*). If the article does not mention the presence of a threat, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Explicit threat
2. Non-threatening, but causing concern
3. Assault on protectee
4. Attempted assault on protectee
5. Damage to protectee's property
6. Damage to protectee's workplace
7. Other
8. N/A – not ascertained
9. A combination of above

B. Type of Threat

Select the description that most closely fits the current threat(s) stated in the media item. If the threat falls into multiple categories, code as 10. If not noted in the media item, code as 12. If the article does not mention the presence of a threat, code as 12. If there was an assault or attempted assault, but no threat is mentioned, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Direct (if the threat clearly designates the victim and the perpetrator, such as "I'll kill you.")
2. Veiled (if the threat is unclear as to the victim and/or the perpetrator)
3. Immediate (if the threat's time frame is immediate. Look for words such as "today," "tomorrow," or "soon.")
4. Deferred (if the threat time frame is delayed by time or condition, such as "in ten years," or "if you find me guilty.")

5. Physical (if the threat explicitly expresses intent to cause physical harm)
6. Intangible (if the threat does not explicitly express intent to cause physical harm)
7. Specious (if threat is not accompanied by evidence of action)
8. Enhanced (if there is evidence of an effort to carry out the threat)
9. Violent (if there was violence against a victim or property in carrying out the threat)
10. A combination of any of the above
11. Other
12. N/A – not ascertained

B. Method of Delivery: Indicate how the IC&C was delivered. If there is no IC, code as 0. If the media item notes an IC&C but does not state a delivery method, code as 8. If the article does not mention the presence of a threat, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Through informant
2. Verbal/by telephone
3. In writing
4. Verbal/face-to-face
5. Electronic (e-mail, Internet)
6. By mail
7. Other
8. N/A – not ascertained
9. A combination of the above

C. Number of Previous ICs Made: Note the number of IC&Cs made by the predator in instances prior to the protective detail described in the media item. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

0. Absent (none)/INAP
1. 1 – 3
2. 4 – 6
3. 7 – 10
4. 11 and above

- 5. N/A - not ascertained
- 6. Multiple threats but number not specified

D. Number of Current IC&Cs Made: Note the number of IC&Cs made by the predator in the incident leading to the protective detail described in the media item. If not stated in the media item, code as 5 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. 1 – 3
- 2. 4 – 6
- 3. 7 – 10
- 4. 11 and above
- 5. N/A - not ascertained
- 6. Multiple threats but number not specified

E. Date(s) of Current IC&C(s): Follow the instructions on the code sheet to note the exact date, date range, or approximate date of the IC&C(s) if indicated in the media item. If the media item does not provide a date, code as 4. If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Exact date provided in article
(If yes, list date on space provided in code sheet)
- 2. Article provides a date range (example: August 21-23, 2008)
(If yes, list date range on space provided in code sheet)
- 3. Article provides an approximate date/date range (example: late August, 2008)
- 4. N/A - not ascertained

V. Protective Detail Characteristics

A. Duration: Indicate the range of duration of the protective detail. If the media item does not indicate the assignment of a protective detail, code as 0. If the item indicates the presence of a protective detail but does not state its time frame, code as 8.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. 7 days or less
- 2. 8 – 14 days
- 3. 15 -30 days
- 4. 31-60 days
- 5. 61 – 90 days
- 6. 91 – 180 days
- 7. 181 days and longer
- 8. N/A – not ascertained

B. Date(s) of Protective Detail: Follow the instructions on the code sheet to note the exact date, date range, or approximate date of the threat(s) if indicated in the media item. If the media item does not provide a date, code as 5. If the media item describes multiple protective details, fill out a separate code sheet for each one.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Exact date provided in article
(If yes, list date on space provided in code sheet)
- 2. Article provides a date range (example: August 21-23, 2008)
(If yes, list date range on space provided in code sheet)
- 3. Article provides an approximate date/date range (example: late August, 2008)
- 4. Article provides a start date but no end date
- 5. N/A - not ascertained

C. Presence of a Threat: Indicate the presence of a threat that led to the assignment of the protective detail. If not noted in the media item, code as 2 (N/A, not ascertained). If none, code as 0.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A – not ascertained

D. Geographic Location: Select the geographic region where the protective detail occurred. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not disclose the detail's location, code as 8.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Northeast
- 2. Midwest
- 3. South
- 4. West
- 5. Overseas or in U.S. territories
- 6. N/A – not ascertained
- 7. A combination of the above

E. Setting: Choose the setting where the protective detail occurred. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not disclose the detail's location, code as 5.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Workplace
- 2. Home
- 3. During travel

4. A combination of above
5. N/A – not ascertained
6. Other

F. Nature of Activities Protected: Note the types of activities protected by the security detail. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not state the nature of the activities protected, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Professional
2. Personal
3. Both
4. Other
5. N/A – not ascertained

G. Use of Human Resources in Implementation: Note whether the protective detail involved the use of agents or other personnel involved in executive protection. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not list an amount, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A – not ascertained

H. Number of Agents Deployed: Choose the range that most closely describes the number of agents utilized in the protective detail. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If no agents were deployed, code as 0. If the media item does not list an amount, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP
1. 1 – 3
2. 4-6
3. 7 – 10
4. 11 and above
5. N/A - not ascertained

I. Use of Technologies in Implementation: State whether the protective detail required the use of technology, such as alarm systems, GPS monitoring, radio frequency monitoring, CCTV, or computers. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the protective detail did not require the use of technology, choose 0. If the media item does not indicate the use of technology, code as 8.

0. Absent/INAP

1. Present
2. N/A – not ascertained

J. Use of Bomb-Sniffing Dogs: Note whether the protective detail involved the use of canines trained to detect the presence of bombs or other explosive devices.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A – not ascertained

K. Use of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Techniques: Indicate the use of CPTED techniques in the protective detail, such as clearing shrubbery away from windows or installing lights operating with a movement sensor.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Present
2. N/A – not ascertained

L. Number of Contact Hours per Day: Choose the range closest to the number of contact hours between the protectee and the protectors during the course of the day.

0. Absent/INAP
1. 1 – 4
2. 5 – 8
3. 9 – 12
4. 13 – 18
5. 19 – 24
6. N/A – not ascertained

M. Level of Acquaintance between Principal and Protector(s): Select the range that best describes the degree of acquaintance between the principal and the protector(s). If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item does not state the degree of acquaintance, code as 7. If the item notes acquaintance without noting the length of time involved, code as 6.

0. Absent/INAP
1. Unacquainted
2. Acquainted for under 90 days
3. Acquainted for 91 days to 1 year
4. Acquainted for over 1 year but less than 5 years
5. Acquainted for over 5 years
6. Acquainted for an unspecified length of time

7. N/A – not ascertained

VI. Intrusiveness of Protective Detail

A. Level of Intrusiveness of Protective Detail: Select the degree of intrusiveness based on the descriptions provided by the media item, if any. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If no descriptive details regarding intrusiveness are provided, code as 6.

0. Absent/INAP (select if there was no protective detail)
1. Non-intrusive (protective detail causes no interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life)
2. Minimally intrusive (protective detail causes minimal interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g. use of technology or CPTED)
3. Moderately intrusive (protective detail causes moderate interruption or interference in protectee's professional or personal life, e.g. escort to workplace)
4. Highly intrusive (protective detail causes high degree of interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g. 24/7 protection for weeks at a time)
5. Severely intrusive (protective detail causes severe interruption or interference in protectee's personal or professional life, e.g. 24/7 protection for extended periods, such as years, use of armored vehicles, use of bomb-sniffing dogs, inability to travel or work with ease)
6. N/A – not ascertained

B. Words used to describe protective detail. List the descriptive words and phrases textually on the code sheet in the space provided. The coding dictionary will include all descriptors collected from the code sheets.

C. Source of comments on intrusiveness: Note who provides the description of the protective detail's level of intrusiveness in the media item. If the source is unclear, note as 7. If no comments were made regarding intrusiveness, code as 7. If there was no protective detail, code as 0.

0. Absent/INAP

1. Protectee
2. Protectors
3. Family member
4. Acquaintance
5. Document author
6. Other
7. N/A – not ascertained
8. Multiple sources

VII. Success/Failure of Protective Detail

A. Degree of success or failure: Select the degree of success or failure of the protective detail according to the values listed below. Base your selection on the descriptions provided by the media item, if any. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If no descriptive details regarding success or failure are provided, are provided, code as 3. If the protectee was unharmed but a family member or a member of his workplace team was harmed, code as 4.

- 2 Failure resulting in death of protectee
- 1 Failure resulting in injury of protectee,
- 0 Absent/INAP,
- +1 Success – protectee is attacked but unharmed,
- +2 Success in which protectee is neither attacked nor harmed,
- 5 N/A – not ascertained
- 6 Other

B. Evasive actions by protectee towards protective detail: If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item notes evasive actions by the protectee, code as 1. If the media item makes no mention of evasive actions by the protectee, code as 2.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A – not ascertained

C. Refusal of protection by protectee: If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item indicates that the protectee refused protection in any way, code as 1. If the media item makes no mention of refusal of protection by the protectee, code as 2.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A – not ascertained

D. Discontinuation of detail: If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item mentions the discontinuation of the protective detail, code as 1. If the media item makes no mention of the discontinuation of the protective detail, code as 2.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Present
- 2. N/A – not ascertained

E. Source of discontinuation of protective detail: Note who discontinued the protective detail. If there was no protective detail, code as 0. If the media item states that the protective detail was discontinued, but does not note the source, code as 7. If the media item makes no mention of the discontinuation of the protective detail, code as 8.

- 0. Absent/INAP
- 1. Protectee
- 2. Law enforcement authorities
- 3. Family member
- 4. Acquaintance
- 5. Other
- 7. N/A – not ascertained
- 8. No mention of discontinuation
- 9. More than one source listed above

Appendix 3 Dictionary of Descriptors of Protective Details

The following dictionary is a compilation of terms used to describe the intrusiveness of protective details, gleaned from a random selection of media items published from March 1999 to March 2009. Each entry includes the term used as a descriptor, its frequency of use in the item pool, the context in which the term appeared in the referenced media item, and the source using the term.

Each term, within each of its contextual units, is assigned a descriptive value based on the following categories:

- +2 Highly positive
- +1 Positive
- 0 Neutral
- 1 Negative
- 2 Highly Negative

TERM	FREQUENCY	CONTEXTUAL UNIT	SOURCE	VALUE
advance agent	2	"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support (Burton & West, 2008)."	author	+2
anonymity	9	"...if agents were forced to testify, it would compromise their anonymity and jeopardize their proximity to the president (Ragavan et al., 2002b)."	author	+1
around the clock	11	"Federal marshals shadowed the prosecutor, who doesn't want to be identified, around the clock for a month (Ove, 2003)."	author	+2
		"... federal marshals camp around the clock waiting, waiting, waiting for the next terror or, more probably, for the next time the judge is ready to step outside to Barnes & Noble or the hair salon."	author	+2
at all times	4	"...covered at all times... (Zolt, 2000)..."	protector	+2
		"...close by at all times...(Zolt, 2000)."	author	+2
attracted to	1	"...there was wide speculation	author	-1

		among Susan watchers that she had become attracted to one of the Secret Service agents assigned to protect her (Ferguson, 2001)."		
bodily	2	"...the agent may have to move the president bodily-place his hands on hips or shoulders-so as to direct him away from an assassin's knife or bullet. (Abrams, 2001) ..."	author	+2
brother	14	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail.... In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother, friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women (Schmich, 2005)."	author	+2
bug	1	"...the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human "bug," squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
canine officer	1	"...the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion, and even by K-9 officers (Ragavan et al., 2002)..."	author	+2
change	46	"...it would change my style of campaigning and how it would limit what we might do (Preston, 2004)."	protectee	-2
chauffeur	13	"Now, U.S. marshals chauffeur Lefkow around in a van with dark windows, shepherd her into elevators and down hallways, lurk at a nearby table when she meets a friend for lunch (Schmich, 2005)."	author	-1
close	82	"...close by at all times...(Zolt, 2000)." "Hinckley said that he was dissuaded from shooting Carter because the Secret Service entourage was protecting him so closely."	author predator	+1 -2
coach	3	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail.... In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother,	author	+2

		friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women (Schmich, 2005)."		
comings and goings	3	"...the comings and goings of Susan and her protective detail (Ferguson, 2001)..."	author	-1
confidence	10	"I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable (Abrams, 2001)."	protectee	+2
		"The visit had provided great pleasure to an enfeebled FDR, but it would never have taken place had he felt more remote from the agents or believed that they might betray his confidence."	author	+2
confidentiality, confidential	22	"...tradition of silence and confidentiality (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	+2
		"...confidential nature of the material to which the agents were exposed (Abrams, 2001)."	author	+2
constantly	7	"...the feeling of being constantly under guard grated on him. (Abrams, 2001)"	author	-2
continuous	3	"Mrs. Johnson's residency at the LBJ Ranch meant the continuous presence of her Secret Service protective detail (Wilson, 2007)..."	author	0
countersniper	3	"...the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion (Ragavan et al., 2002)..."	author	+2
		"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support (Burton & West, 2008)."	author	+2
covered	9	"...covered at all times (Zolt, 2000)..."	protector	+2
		"it covered 'Vice President Cheney's every move (Ragavan, 2002)..."	other	+2
different	47	"...life as they know it would still be normal. It would just be slightly different (Fuchs, 2000)."	protector	-1

discretion, discreet	4	<p>"...the intimacy that depends on total discretion (Abrams, 2001)?"</p> <p>"I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable (Abrams, 2001)."</p>	author	+2
			protectee	+2
dog handler	1	"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support (Burton & West, 2008)."	author	+2
duty	30	"...what they had seen or heard in the course of their duties (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	+1
elite	13	"...the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion (Ragavan et al., 2002)..."	author	+2
envelope	2	"...profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him (Abrams, 2001)."	author	-2
explosive	12	"The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support (Burton & West, 2008)."	author	+2
flanked	2	<p>"... walking down a Chicago street flanked by federal marshals (Schmich, 2005)..."</p> <p>"In the hallway, she stands flanked by marshals, like an actor poised for curtain call (Schmich, 2005)."</p>	author	-2
			author	-2
friend	93	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail.... In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother, friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women (Schmich, 2005)."	author	+2
grated	1	"...the feeling of being constantly under guard grated on him."	author	-2

		(Abrams, 2001)"		
guard	87	"...the feeling of being constantly under guard grated on him. (Abrams, 2001)"	author	-2
hamper	2	"The agents...constantly hamper his ability to interact with the voting public (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
handyman	1	"Darryl McPherson is the head marshal on Lefkow's protective detail.... In these strange weeks McPherson has become brother, friend, handyman and coach to the Lefkow women (Schmich, 2005)."	author	+2
hear, heard	98	"...hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)..." "...what they had seen or heard in the course of their duties (Abrams, 2001)..." "...to determine what they may have seen or heard about the president's relationship with Lewinsky (Ragavan et al., 2002b)."	author author author	-2 0 -2
hide, hiding	3	"There's no hiding behind a chief of staff or a protective detail (Moscow-Pullman Daily News, 2009)."	author	-2
honorable	5	"I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable (Abrams, 2001)."	protectee	+2
hover	6	"...while they hover around the bridal shop, the theater or the grocery store with their sunglasses and their cell phones (Schmich, 2005).... "	author	-2
informer	1	"...the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human "bug," squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
interaction, interact	8	"...private presidential speech or action in the Oval Office, in his bedroom, in his limousine, or in his interactions with foreign leaders in Washington or abroad (Abrams,	author	+2

		2001)...” “The agents...constantly hamper his ability to interact with the voting public (Abrams, 2001)...”	author	-2
intimacy	1	“...the intimacy that depends on total discretion (Abrams, 2001)?”	author	+2
intrusive, intrusion, intrude	9	“Will any president accept such intrusive behavior (Abrams, 2001)...” “The agents intrude on his privacy (Abrams, 2001)...” “...a panic button was installed under a table near Owens's desk so she can summon help if there is an intrusion (Mosk, 2001).”	author author author	-2 -2 -2
life	56	“...a protective detail for life (Zolt, 2000)...” “...observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)...” “They take over your life...”	author author protectee	+2 -2 -2
lifestyle	2	“...a very severe restriction on your lifestyle and your ability to campaign.”	protectee	+1
love	36	“The polite tenderness they exchange sometimes looks a lot like love (Schmich, 2005).”	author	+2
lurk	3	“Now, U.S. marshals chauffeur Lefkow around in a van with dark windows, shepherd her into elevators and down hallways, lurk at a nearby table when she meets a friend for lunch (Schmich, 2005).”	author	-2
metal detector	3	“The advance agents are supplemented by teams of extra agents to help secure sites; dog handlers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians to check for explosive devices; and uniformed officers to help control access to sites, man metal detectors and provide countersniper support (Burton & West, 2008).”	author	+2
move	38	“...the agent may have to move	author	+2

		the president bodily (Abrams, 2001) ...” “it covered ‘Vice President Cheney’s every move (Ragavan, 2002).”	other	-2
nearby	16	“If a President feels that Secret Service agents can be called to testify about what they might have seen or heard, then it is likely that the President will be uncomfortable having the agents nearby (Abrams, 2001)...”	author	-2
normal	19	“...life as they know it would still be normal. It would just be slightly different (Fuchs, 2000).”	protector	+2
observe	10	“...observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)...”	author	-2
plan	38	“...shift his travel plan (Abrams, 2001)...” “...replan his travel route if required (Abrams, 2001).”	author	0 -1
prisoner	2	“...he complained that he ‘was really a prisoner now’ (Abrams, 2001)”	protectee	-2
private, privacy	53	“...private presidential speech or action in the Oval Office, in his bedroom, in his limousine, or in his interactions with foreign leaders in Washington or abroad (Abrams, 2001)...” “...a President could not count on privacy (Abrams, 2001)...” “The agents intrude on his privacy (Abrams, 2001)...” “All gone, along with her privacy, her autonomy (Schmich, 2005)...”	author author author author	+2 +2 +2 +2
privilege	64	“...protective function privilege (Abrams, 2001, Ragavan et al., 2002, Ragavan et al., 2002b)...”	author	+2
proximity	7	“I allowed the agents to have proximity first because they had my full confidence and secondly because I knew them to be totally discreet and honorable (Abrams, 2001).”	protectee author	+2 +2

		"...if agents were forced to testify, it would compromise their anonymity and jeopardize their proximity to the president (Ragavan et al., 2002b)."		
rat out	1	"...you guys ratted out the president (Ragavan et al., 2002b)."	protector	-2
regret	8	"...regretted needing it (Preston, 2004)..."	protectee	-2
relationship	35	"...the president's 'relationship with his protectors (Abrams, 2001)..." "...to determine what they may have seen or heard about the president's relationship with Lewinsky (Ragavan et al., 2002b)."	author author	+2 -2
restrict, restriction	15	"...restrict him from leaving his limousine until it is safe (Abrams, 2001)..." "...a very severe restriction on your lifestyle and your ability to campaign (Preston, 2004)."	author protectee	+2 -2
risk	20	"The agents...see risk where none exists (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
secrecy	1	"Secrecy existed from the time the service first assumed its protective role (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	+1
security	523	"He would much have preferred less security than more (Abrams, 2001)."	author	-2
see, seen	85	"...what they had seen or heard in the course of their duties (Abrams, 2001)..." "The agents...see risk where none exists (Abrams, 2001)..." "...to determine what they may have seen or heard about the president's relationship with Lewinsky (Ragavan et al., 2002b)."	author author author	0 -1 0
serious, seriously	26	"We took it seriously (Ove, 2003)."	protectee	+2
severe	7	"...a very severe restriction on your lifestyle and your ability to campaign (Preston, 2004)."	protectee	-2
shadow	6	"Federal marshals shadowed the prosecutor, who doesn't want to be identified, around the clock for a month (Ove, 2003)."	author	+2
shepherd	2	"Now, U.S. marshals chauffeur	author	-2

		Lefkow around in a van with dark windows, shepherd her into elevators and down hallways, lurk at a nearby table when she meets a friend for lunch (Schmich, 2005)."		
shift	21	"...shift his travel plan (Abrams, 2001)..." "Their schedule may be grueling; when the president is abroad, an eight-hour shift may stretch to eighteen or twenty-four (Abrams, 2001)..."	author author	-1 -2
silence	9	"...tradition of silence and confidentiality (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	+2
snitch	1	"...the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human "bug," squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
sobering	2	"... a sobering reality (Ove, 2003)..." "...a sobering experience (O'Connor & Rucker, 2005)."	author protectee	+2 +2
space	16	"But there's 21 members of the governor's protective detail that probably use up a good third of the space (Root, 2007)."	protectee	-2
squealer	1	"...the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human "bug," squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
stool pigeon	1	"...the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human "bug," squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or	author	-2

		guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)..."		
surround, surrounded	13	"...profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him (Abrams, 2001)." "In her solitude, she feels surrounded; in her loneliness, robbed of the right to be alone (Schmich, 2005)."	author	-2
			author	-2
tight	8	"...profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him (Abrams, 2001)."	author	-2
travel	65	"...shift his travel plan (Abrams, 2001)..." "...replan his travel route if required (Abrams, 2001)"	author	-1
				-1
trust	38	"...an atmosphere of trust (Abrams, 2001)..." "The President trusted Mike Reilly (chief of the White House detail) more than most of his cabinet (Abrams, 2001)." "The marshals are there to make her less afraid, but their presence tells her to be wary. Wary of her reflex even now to trust (Schmich, 2005)."	author	+2
			author	+2
			author	-2
uncomfortable	2	"...profoundly uncomfortable with the tight envelope that surrounds him (Abrams, 2001)." "If a President feels that Secret Service agents can be called to testify about what they might have seen or heard, then it is likely that the President will be uncomfortable having the agents nearby (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
			protectee	-2
unobtrusive	1	"...as unobtrusive as possible (Zolt, 2000)..."	protector	+2
wary	4	"The marshals are there to make her less afraid, but their presence tells her to be wary. Wary of her reflex even now to trust (Schmich, 2005)."	author	-2
watch	40	"...the elite corps of White House countersnipers, who stand watch on the roof of the presidential mansion (Ragavan et al., 2002)..."	author	+2

		"Now she's watched, always watched. By the media. The marshals. Who knows who else (Schmich, 2005)."	author	-2
wiretapper	1	"...the premise that a president-or any one of us-would trust and permit a potential stool pigeon, informer, human "bug," squealer, snitch, or wiretapper to observe virtually every moment of our waking lives and to hear conversations with our family or guests that might abut on private or policy matters (Abrams, 2001)..."	author	-2
zealous	2	"...the most zealous protection (Ragavan et al., 2002)."	author	+2